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Abstract This article examines the establishment
and development of a protected ‘green’ niche around
the solar manufacturing industry in the United States
in the 2000s. The paper uses the case of Solyndra, an
innovative solar manufacturing corporation founded
in 2005 and that went bankrupt in 2011, as a window
into identifying the key factors that led to the failure of
Solyndra. Solyndra was, at the time, the largest
recipient of loan funding from the US Department of
Energy, making it into the main representative of a key
strategic industry identified as a target for federal
support as part of US stimulus funding after the 2008
financial crisis. The analysis of the Solyndra failure
case presented here highlights the need for strategic
transitional niches to be shielded longitudinally by a
strategic, entrepreneurial state, and considered in light
of transnational exogenous factors. The article also
argues for the importance of analysing discursive
strategies that perform strategic niches as belonging to
specific societal pathways.
Keywords Solar power  Niche  Multi-level
perspective  Green economy  Transition 
Sustainability  Economic geography
Introduction: the ‘Solar Renaissance’
The article focuses on the rise and fall of Solyndra, a
corporation that aimed to take its place in the
‘renaissance’ of the US solar industry from 2005 to
2011. The firm aimed to manufacture and sell
innovative thin-film photovoltaic (PV) panels by
utilizing new materials not dependent on the then
high prices of polysilicon. In 2009 Solyndra received a
US$ 535 million loan from the US Department of
Energy’s (DOE) Loan Guarantee Program (LGP).
This was the largest LGP loan awarded to a renewable
energy corporation. It was heralded as a step towards
bolstering the US’s solar manufacturing capacity,
while also creating jobs in the new ‘green economy’
and lowering the use of carbon-intensive fuels and
technologies. Using the theoretical perspectives found
within studies of socio-technical transitions, this
article conceptualises the LGP’s support of Solyndra
as a specific example of state-led support of a niche
that promised innovative potential.
While Solyndra was identified as a potential niche
success story, by late 2011 the firm had declared
bankruptcy and its new manufacturing facilities stood
empty. This occurred largely due to several exogenous
factors, outlined below, that affected the protected
niche within which Solyndra was meant to develop.
The case of Solyndra raises important questions
concerning how niches are conceptualised and sup-
ported in the remit of state-sponsored sustainability
transition strategies (Caprotti 2010). Specifically, the
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article raises the twin issues of: a.) the necessity of
partially isolating niches from the vagaries of market
pricing (and their political-economic uses, as seen in
the recent example of the effect of falling oil prices on
the US fracking industry), and b.) the need to envision
the protection of innovative niches as a longitudinal
strategy which requires sustained and consistent
temporal commitment.1
The paper examines the rise and fall of Solyndra,
and the ways in which the firm was discursively
constructed and performed during its brief lifespan.
This analysis is based on examination of documentary
sources relating to the firm’s development and even-
tual bankruptcy. A comprehensive study was made of
reports and documents from the following sources: the
US Congress, the US Bankruptcy Court, the Depart-
ment of Energy (DOE), and the Department of the
Treasury (DOT). Additionally, data from national
non-profit organizations, such as the National Renew-
able Energy Association (NREL), was used. Corporate
reports were also analysed, as were market reports
from associations and industry bodies such as the
Solar Energy Industries Association (SEIA).
Theoretical context: green niches
Solyndra is an example of a single firm that was to
become a protected niche around solar manufacturing.
As the discussion below shows, while niches are
generally conceived as protected envelopes (Geels
2012), protection of the niche around Solyndra was not
sufficiently developed. Solyndra is an important case
for analysis because while it rose quickly and was
constructed and performed as the central actor within
the ‘green’ niche around renewable energy in the US
in the late 2000s, its failure was also the subject of
discursive contestation around the meaning of its
bankruptcy for state support of innovative
technologies.
The notion of niche utilised here derives from the
large body of literature on socio-technical transitions.
Specifically, theories of transition attempt to under-
stand the way(s) in which innovative technologies,
practices and ‘ways of doing’ emerge and are widely
adopted, or fail. To do so, a conceptual perspective
known as the multi-level perspective (MLP) is widely
used. Briefly, studies of transition informed by the
MLP focus on the ways in which innovation is
articulated across three separate but porous levels, i.e.,
the ‘niche’, the broader ‘regime’, and the ‘landscape’.
Niches are the level at which innovations can grow and
are developed. They are characterised by levels of
innovative potential ranging from the highly radical to
the simply innovative (Smith 2007). At the next level,
socio-technical regimes are broad, dominant sets of
rules, agendas, guiding principles, government regu-
lations, and groups of actors (Geels Rip and Kemp
1998). Although regimes tend towards stability, niche
innovations have the potential to interact with, and
potentially change, the regime. After the regime, the
socio-technical landscape constitutes the macro-level,
exogenous environment that specific actors cannot
modify, but which can be gradually changed through
regime modifications (Geels 2005).
Scholars of transition have recently focused on the
renewable energy sector, including the solar energy
industry, as examples of the emergence of regime-
changing innovations within niches. Smith and Raven
(2012), for example, described the development of the
photovoltaic industry since the 1960s as a result of a
succession of niche developments:
‘One can think, for example, of the development
of solar photovoltaic cells initially within a
‘protective space’ constituted by satellite pro-
grammes in the 1960s, public research pro-
grammes in materials science, and policies for
developing renewable energy since the 1970s.
The protective space was widened further
through international aid programmes for PV
power systems in remote, off-grid development
projects. Since the 1990s, sustainable energy
policy in some wealthier countries has opened a
market-niche for integrating or retrofitting solar
power systems into buildings…’ (Smith and
Raven 2012: 1025).
A number of studies focusing on a range of
industries and innovative developments, from animal
husbandry (Elzen et al. 2011) to institutional niches in
the carbon economy (Foxon 2011) have highlighted
1 In analysing the Solyndra case in light of these issues, it is key
to acknowledge and remain sensitive to the fact that multiple
factors (such as those related to management and decision-
making and adverse market conditions) contribute to bank-
ruptcy, and that the paper’s focus is on bankruptcy as a means
with which to interrogate the protection and management of
niches.
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the need for not only understanding niches in the
process of transition, but also managing them
(Hoogma et al. 2002; Kemp et al. 1998) as a way of
facilitating and directing transitions (Markard et al.
2012). This results from the understanding that
although sustainability transitions are path-dependent,
pathways encompass broad avenues of possible tran-
sition gradients within specific boundaries (a ‘transi-
tion envelope’) (Bailey and Wilson 2009). In turn, this
envelope is determined by a range of factors, including
the discursive context around what is deemed soci-
etally possible, or acceptable. Building on this, it is
therefore crucial to understand the ways in which
niches are protected. Smith and Raven (2012) argue
that this occurs through three main mechanisms:
shielding, nurturing and empowerment. Shielding
involves protecting a niche from external pressures;
nurturing practices, such as the construction of
networks of relevant actors, are focused on helping
niches to develop; and empowerment refers to
processes that enable niches to eventually compete
either within an unchanged regime, or within a regime
that has been modified to some extent by the niche. As
will be shown, in the case of Solyndra it is clear that
the corporation was not effectively shielded, while
nurturing and empowerment practices were in evi-
dence in the US government’s attempts to position
Solyndra as a key innovative actor.
The ‘green’ niche of which Solyndra was a central
part can be considered as nested within the wider
electricity generation and distribution regime (Smith
2007; Smith et al. 2005). The regime level can be
considered as the assemblage of the institutions (such
as state energy departments, energy corporations),
practices (such as political discourses, knowledge
production mechanisms, and the like) and materialities
(such as specific technologies, materials and net-
works) that are the basis for the delivery of a societal
service such as energy production (Bolton and Foxon
2015). In the specific context of Solyndra, the regime
could also be considered in a spatialized manner, by
identifying it with the specific US electricity and
distribution context, although this definition runs the
risk of ignoring the transnational factors, explored
below, which contribute to niche emergence and
eventual regime change.
Since Solyndra received over 40 % of state-
provided loan funds aimed at supporting the solar
industry, the corporation can be considered as having
constituted a large part of the US solar energy niche.
Nonetheless, in analysing the Solyndra ‘story’, it is
also key to highlight three additional dimensions
which impacted on the niche around Solyndra,
namely:
(a) The transnational spatial scale.
There have been recent calls to spatialise studies of
transition and, more specifically, to apply a level of
spatial and scalar awareness to analyses of niche
development (Sengers and Raven 2015; Spa¨th and
Rohracher 2012). The article contributes to this
awareness by considering transnational factors
transnational factors: the paper draws on recent work
on solar energy niches which highlight the necessarily
transnational character of niche development (Wiec-
zorek et al. 2015). As Gress (2015: 114) has noted with
regard to the Chinese solar industry, the nature of the
solar market is such that Chinese solar corporations
‘have had no choice but to interact with firms and
governments outside of China while at the same time
undertaking core business activities in mainland China
in an era of progressively market-oriented policy
shifts’. With regard to factors key to the Solyndra case,
this involved fluctuations in the market price of
polysilicon, the Chinese state, European governments
and their renewables targets, as well as non-American
solar panel manufacturing firms (Caprotti 2015).
Furthermore, the article argues that it is important to
consider ‘failure cases’ such as Solyndra because of
what they highlight in terms of the role of transnational
factors in affecting and contributing towards outcomes
and development pathways in ‘protected’ niche
spaces.
(b) political discourses and narratives
Discourses, narratives and debates are key to niche
development trajectories. The development of renew-
able energy innovations is often presented as a
‘technical’ narrative of incremental developments in
knowledge, know-how and product offerings. How-
ever, research into the development of solar power in
Europe from the late twentieth century onwards, from
the UK (Smith et al. 2014), to Finland (Haukkala
2015) and the Netherlands (Verhees et al. 2013) has
highlighted the need to consider green niches as the
result not only of processes of technological and other
forms of innovation, but also of discursive and
political contestation and debate (Karimi and
GeoJournal
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Komendatova 2015; Petrova et al. 2013; Spa¨th and
Rohracher 2010, 2012). In addition, as Hess (2013)
has shown in the case of solar innovations, opposi-
tional strategies are key in shaping transitional path-
ways to adoption or non-adoption of solar
technologies. This article engages with these aspects
of niche development by focusing on the ways in
which Solyndra was discursively defined and opposed
by a range of actors. As Verhees et al. (2013) noted in
their study of the ‘survival’ of the Dutch PV industry,
niches exist within, and interact with, contexts which
involve discursive arenas and agendas linked to a
broad range of issues, from energy security to
economic development (Fischhendler et al. 2015).
As is shown below, Solyndra was similarly deployed
as a discursive focus for narrative strategies which
were deeply political. Between 2005, when it was
incorporated, and 2011, when it was declared bank-
rupt, Solyndra’s discursive identity ranged from being
depicted as a provider of ‘clean and economical solar
power’ (Solyndra 2012), to a firm which Mitt Romney,
2012 Republican presidential candidate, decried as an
example of wasteful use of public funds to construct a
‘‘symbol not of success, but of failure’ (Romney, in
Friedman 2012). The terrain of discursive perfor-
mance in a context of international economic and
energy geopolitics (Hommel and Murphy 2013; Joshi
2014; McCarthy et al. 2014), then, becomes a key
locus for debate over transitional trajectories. This also
highlights the intersection between discourses, many
of which (such as those which performed Solyndra in
the US) are national in character and context, and the
transnational spatial scale that is key in influencing the
development of these more nationally rooted
discourses.
(c) The state.
Finally, the role of the state is thrown into promi-
nence when considering the Solyndra case. Political
tensions around the funding of renewable energy
innovations in the 2000s and early 2010s were central
to the firm’s trajectory and eventual failure. Nonethe-
less, the state was also a key actor enabling the rise of
the solar niche in the first place (Olson and Biong
2015). In part, this is because of its earlier role in
supporting (through programmes from the space
programme, to research and development funding)
the various technical and scientific components which
emerged into Solyndra’s specific innovative offering.
As Mazzucato (2013) argues, the state can be consid-
ered entrepreneurial in its backing of early-stage
technologies and innovations which eventually gain
market dominance, or are incorporated (perhaps with a
time lag of decades) within different innovative
solutions. What the paper will also show is that the
role of other states is crucial because the US govern-
ment’s support for Solyndra intersected with the
actions of other governments in supporting domestic
technology firms, or in changing subsidy regimes.
Therefore, protected ‘green’ niches can be under-
stood as emerging in and through the interaction of
material, discursive, political and geopolitical dimen-
sions. This highlights the importance of transnational
scale at the same time as the key role of discourses that
are much more national in character, but which
emerge (at least in part) as a response to transnational
and global economic and other concerns. The role of
the state, in turn, is confirmed as central both to niche
development, and to niche failure when the state is
unable to design and guarantee mechanisms which
shield niches, as seen below. In the context of the
production of protected niches, then, it becomes key to
consider the specific mechanisms through which
niches are produced on the one hand, and protected
on the other. These mechanisms include, among
others, the role of international state and corporate
actors as well as the agency of calculative market
factors such as raw material prices; the discursive
identification and performance of selected niches; a
public and private financially enabling environment
(from state-backed loans to ease of access to venture
finance); a potentially protective regulatory context;
political stability and longevity in backing strategic
niche developments longitudinally; and an emergent
socio-technical assemblage of technologies and
knowledge that contributes to the innovations central
to a specific niche.
The US solar energy industry
The global solar industry emerged rapidly in the
2000s, mirroring the rise in environmental technology
investments more broadly over the same time period.
Globally, solar power investments grew from US$ 66
million in 2000, to US$ 2.5 billion in 2005, to US$
136.6 billion by the end of 2011 (Jennings et al. 2008;
McCrone 2012). The US solar market mirrored these
GeoJournal
123
rapid investment inflows, especially since 2005: while
capital investments in solar energy (including govern-
ment-funded R&D) increased slightly in 2000–2004,
from US$ 164 million to US$ 215 million per annum,
there was a rapid increase in yearly investment by
2007, to US$ 3.2 billion. By 2007, over 95 % of solar
investments in the US originated from the private
sector, predominantly from public and private equity
and venture capital (Jennings et al. 2008).
Rapid growth in investment meant that by the end
of 2011, the US solar market was worth over US$ 8.4
billion (SEIA 2012b). This stimulated the expansion
of the solar manufacturing sector, the specific industry
in which Solyndra operated. Between 2010 and June
2012, 59 new solar manufacturing facilities com-
menced operations across the US (SEIA 2012a): these
were largely located in California. Both the predom-
inance of California in the landscape of the US solar
industry, and the growth in US installed capacity were
due to a multiplicity of factors that cannot be fully
explored here.2 However, the overall picture is of a
national but highly spatially concentrated market that
saw a significant ‘take-off’ period in the 2000s, albeit
from a modest starting point. California was the main
geographical location in which attempts to define and
protect a solar energy niche were focused.
While the Solyndra case is nested within the
context of a rapidly emergent US solar industry, a
further contextual factor is the wider globalization of
renewable energy industries in the 2000s. While the
solar energy industry, and indeed the whole renewable
energy sector, was developing rapidly in the US, the
period 2000–2012 was also marked by a notable shift
in market power and market share away from the US.
While the US controlled 43 % of global solar manu-
facturing in 1995, this had declined to 27 % by 2000,
and to 7 % in 2010 (DOE 2012e). In particular, China
emerged as the global centre of solar manufacturing:
in 2010 and 2011, the US produced solar cells for a
cumulative total capacity of less than 2GW in 2010
and 2011, while China produced cells for a total of
c.11GW of capacity in 2010 alone (DOE 2012h, i). By
the end of 2010, Chinese firms controlled 17 % of the
global silicon market, which is of central importance
to solar manufacturing (DOE 2012f; Casey and
Koleski 2011).
The global, transnational context has had clear
spatial and market consequences within the US
market. While California remained the largest solar-
manufacturing state in the US in 2010, by the fourth
quarter of the same year, Chinese solar firms overtook
US-based counterparts in accounting for the largest
stake of the state’s installed solar power (31 %, as
opposed to the 25 % installed by US firms) (Wesoff
2011). This was mainly due to the Chinese govern-
ment’s subsidy programmes for solar energy (World
Bank 2010), part of a national attempt to promote a
domestic solar niche that, in turn, had significant
effects on the US solar niche. It is within this
transnational niche context that the Solyndra case
can be set.
Solyndra and the Loan Guarantee Program
Solyndra (originally Gronet Technologies) was incor-
porated on 10 May 2005, and renamed Solyndra in
January 2006.3 The firm’s future was staked on its
thin-film tubular solar module technology. In turn,
projected demand for its solar products was based on
the low price of Solyndra’s modules vis-a`-vis the price
of more conventional PV modules. The price of
Solyndra’s modules was thus determined by the price
of the material used to produce the modules, which
was the central pivot of Solyndra’s innovation. This
material (a combination of copper, indium, gallium
and diselenide, commonly referred to as CIGS) was
different to the single crystal silicon or more com-
monly used polycrystalline silicon (hereinafter
referred to as polysilicon) utilised in most solar
manufacturing at the time. Polysilicon prices experi-
enced a steady rise from 2005, reaching a decadal high
in 2008. This pushed the price of standard solar panels
increasingly higher. By betting on a technology not
reliant on polysilicon, Solyndra was attempting to
2 These factors include ARRA funding, federal incentive
policies such as tax credits through 2016; state Renewable
Portfolio Standard requirements, state financial incentives, and
improved liquidity in capital markets.
3 More than ten subsidiary firms carrying the Solyndra name
were subsequently incorporated in 2006–2011 and focused on
specific tasks, such as holding the assets for the manufacturing
plant made possible by the DOE’s loan guarantee (the subsidiary
was called Fab. 2 LLC), or operating in the European market
(Solyndra GmbH), were subsequently founded. The subsidiaries
were operational until the firm’s restructuring in 2011 (Neilson
2012).
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leverage the cost of CIGS against the higher cost of
polysilicon on the global market.
Solyndra’s thin-film modules were organized in
cylindrical tubes around one metre in length to protect
the panel from thin film degradation. The firm’s panels
were mostly aimed at the rooftop installation market,
focusing on utilising the large amounts of roof space
available on commercial and other buildings. Its major
installations included a 7000 module, 1.28 MW array
in Tolouse, France, for Nazca (a subsidiary of the GSE
Group, a global building, civil engineering and
construction conglomerate) (Solyndra 2010). Solyn-
dra’s largest project was a 3 MW installation in
Belgium that incorporated 17,000 rooftop solar mod-
ules on a distribution centre, owned by the Delhaize
supermarket corporation (Solyndra 2011). The firm
was therefore using innovative technology to open up
a new market, capitalising on commercial rooftop
space.
A key part of Solyndra’s business plan was the
construction of manufacturing plants that could pro-
duce high volumes of thin-film modules at lower cost
than rival polysilicon-based plants (Neilson 2012).
This would have enabled Solyndra to outcompete
other firms in the US solar market and present a
considerable challenge to Chinese polysilicon-based
solar manufacturers. In order to produce large quan-
tities of these modules, Solyndra needed a large,
advanced production facility. Although the firm had
already attracted significant amounts of private fund-
ing, a sizeable public investment was sought in order
to enable the construction of Solyndra’s new advanced
manufacturing plant. In March 2009, Solyndra became
the first corporation to receive funding from the
DOE’s loan guarantee scheme, the LGP (DOE 2009,
2011a, 2012b; Solyndra 2009). The loan was directed
at funding the construction of a high-tech manufac-
turing facility in Fremont, California, named ‘Fab. 2’.
The facility aimed to produce modules capable of
generating a cumulative 230 MW per annum (Exec-
utive Office of the President 2010), and of initially
creating 3000 construction jobs, followed by 1000
long-term manufacturing, ‘green collar’ jobs once the
facility was fully operational (Office of the Vice
President, press release, 4 September 2009). This
manufacturing and job-creation target was champi-
oned at the highest levels. In president Obama’s 2010
State of the Union address, the loan was discursively
directly linked to job creation:
‘You can see the results of last year’s invest-
ments in clean energy […] in the California
business that will put a thousand people to work
making solar panels’ (Obama 2010a, np)
The US$ 535 million loan secured by Solyndra was
granted under Title XVII (‘Incentives for Innovative
Technologies’) of the 2005 Energy Policy Act (EPA).
The EPA defined innovative technologies as those that
can be readily exploited in a ‘commercial’ setting, thus
implicitly linking a potential domestic niche to the
wider global market, and constructing a need for niche
innovations to immediately compete and soon shed
any shielding they may have had from market forces
(EPA 2005). Solyndra’s technology was thus con-
structed as blending innovation and commercial
potential. It was also depicted as providing a key
example of the rebirth of skilled manufacturing in the
new context of the ‘green economy’ (Bailey and
Caprotti 2014; Caprotti and Bailey 2014). As Energy
Secretary Chu stated regarding the Solyndra project
loan:
‘This investment is part of a broad, aggressive
effort to spark a new industrial revolution that
will put Americans to work, end our dependence
on foreign oil and cut carbon pollution’ (Office
of the Vice President, press release, 4 September
2009, 1).
The Solyndra loan was thus crucially situated at the
interface between concerns over the US’ sliding
market share in renewable technologies and tensions
over the economic and political response to the 2008
financial crisis. The government act that tackled the
latter concern most directly was the 2009 American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA), which
introduced a range of stimulus funding. Title XVII
of the EPA, which mandated innovative technology
incentives as seen above, was amended by Sec-
tion 1705 of the ARRA, to focus specifically on
renewable energy and electric power transmission
projects (ARRA 2009). This availed US$ 16.15 billion
to projects, including solar power manufacturing and
generation. The importance of the emerging solar
energy niche in the US can be seen by the fact that
82 % (US$ 13.27 billion) of the loans offered under
Section 1705 were directed to solar energy projects.
Of this, solar manufacturing projects accounted for
US$ 1.28 billion, including the Solyndra deal (see
GeoJournal
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Table 1), with the remainder awarded to solar gener-
ation projects (Brown 2011).4
The stimulus funding target most relevant to
Solyndra was that of doubling domestic renewable
manufacturing capacity from 6 GW to 12 GW by the
end of 2011. This was discursively framed as a way of
generating ‘green collar jobs’ at home, and responding
to market pressures originating overseas:
‘Three decades ago, the U.S. led the world in the
development of renewable energy, such as wind,
solar, and geothermal power. Since then, mar-
kets for renewable energy have grown predom-
inantly overseas due to strong, consistent foreign
government incentives and policies. As a result,
manufacturing… has grown largely overseas as
well. Recovery Act investments are helping the
U.S. re-establish leadership in innovation, man-
ufacturing, and deployment in these fast-grow-
ing industries, which will create new jobs,
increase access to clean energy, and reduce
greenhouse gas emissions’ (Executive Office of
the President 2010, 17).
Thus, the Solyndra LGP award was discursively
constructed as a way of establishing a green niche
around solar manufacturing. This strategy spanned
political terms: even though the Obama administration
took office in January 2009, the loan was duly
approved in March. The Solyndra loan was also the
first loan to be financed through the DOT’s Federal
Financing Bank (FFB).5 FFB only funds loans which
are 100 % guaranteed by the DOE, which means that
the financial risk associated with the Solyndra failure
was directly tied to the DOE and, therefore, to the
American taxpayer:
‘Because loans under DOE’s LGP are guaran-
teed, FFB has not, and will not incur any direct
credit-related losses associated with the pro-
gram. All credit losses under the LGP are the
responsibility of DOE, and are ultimately borne
by the American taxpayers’ (DOT 2012, 4).
This was an important consideration in terms of
defining the Solyndra niche, because one of the
conditions for the loan was that the first creditor to
be repaid in case of a bankruptcy was to be the
government. Although this was subsequently partially
changed (in 2011, US$ 75 million of private loans
were prioritised as ‘senior debt’ over the much larger
federal loan amount), this contributed to the inhibition
of private investors from granting Solyndra a financial
lifeline at the time of the bankruptcy. Nonetheless,
before gaining federal funding, the firm was highly
successful in attracting private capital from a range of
sources. Table 2 is based on a 2009 filing with the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which
only detailed investors holding 5 % or more in the
firm, or directors’ investments: over US$ 598 million
were committed by this category of investor (DOE
2012d). By the time of the bankruptcy, the total
amount of private equity invested in Solyndra was
over US$ 1.2 billion (Neilson 2012).
Table 1 Solar manufacturing projects supported by the DOE’s Section 1705 Loan Guarantee Program (Brown 2011: 4)
Project Loan Guarantee
Amount
Technology
Solyndra, Inc. $ 535 million Cylindrical CIGS photovoltaic cell and module manufacturing for commercial rooftop
applications
Abound Solar $ 400 million Manufacturing process for thin-film cadmium telluride (CdTe) for PV modules
SoloPower $ 197 million CIGS photovoltaic cell and module manufacturing process
1366
Technologies
$ 150 million Silicon solar wafer manufacturing process
Total $ 1282 million
4 Overall, the US$ 13.27 billion awarded to solar projects under
Section 1705 of the LGP was the lion’s share, compared to the
amounts given to other project areas: wind generation (US$
1687.9 million); geothermal (US$ 545.5 million), transmission
(US$ 343 million) biofuel (US$ 132.4 million) energy storage
(US$ 43 million) (DOE Loans Programs Office 2012a, b, c, d, e,
f, g, h, i).
5 The FFB is a government corporation set up by the Congress
in 1973: one of its main remits is the coordination of ‘federal and
federally assisted borrowing programs with the overall eco-
nomic and fiscal policies of the Government’ (DOT 2012: 3).
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Solyndra was widely celebrated as a flagship
example of American solar technology innovation.
In 2010 MIT’s Technology Review chose Solyndra as
one of the top 50 most innovative companies globally.
In the same year, the Wall Street Journal named
Solyndra as one of its top 50 venture-backed compa-
nies. An informal poll by Reuters of venture capital
investors’ picks for companies with potential for
acquisition or being floated on the stock market ranked
Solyndra as second, behind social networking firm
Linkedin (DOE 2012c). Solyndra was clearly con-
structed as an embodiment of the market potential of
solar energy technologies in the US and on the
international market. Solyndra’s development, in
terms of amount of capital invested in the firm’s fixed
assets, as well as in its human capital and inventory,
was both rapid and highly public, indicative of the
successful initial promotion of a green niche. Its
demise was even more expeditious and publicly
displayed and debated. It is to the Solyndra bankruptcy
that the paper now turns.
The fall of Solyndra
Solyndra’s collapse was partly written in the fluctu-
ations of the market price of polysilicon. Throughout
2005, the spot price of polysilicon was below US$
100/kg. By August 2008, this had risen to a decadal
high of US$ 450/kg, making Solyndra’s products very
competitive. However, from August 2008 to June
2009, the spot price declined rapidly, to below US$
100/kg. By December 2011, the price had declined
further, to US$ 30/kg (GTM Research 2012). By mid-
2013, prices hit an all-time low of US$ 16.9/kg. This
represented a price decline of over 90 % in
2008–2013: a fatal hindrance to a corporation founded
on the assumption of the persistence of high polysil-
icon prices. The global market price of polysilicon was
affected in large part by Chinese solar subsidies, which
had the effect of depressing prices.6
The effect of the drop in the price polysilicon on
Solyndra was significant and quickly felt (Fig. 1). The
polysilicon price decrease led to reduced panel prices
(SEIA 2012a), leading to a drop in the price of solar
installations by 14 % (for residential installations) and
20 % (for commercial installations) in 2010 alone
(Sherwood 2011). This contributed to Solyndra’s
financial woes. Ironically, at the same time, it also
signified a greater competitiveness for solar vis-a`-vis
other, more traditional energy sources. The decreased
Table 2 Largest amounts
of private capital invested in
Solyndra, December 2009
(DOE 2012d)
Investor Amount (US$)
Argonaut Ventures I, LLC $ 270.65 million
GKFF Investment Company, LLC $ 100 million
Affiliates of Artis Capital Management, LP $ 44 million
Madrone Partners, LP $ 37.22 million
Virgin Green Fund I, LP $ 34.86 million
US Venture Partners IX, LP $ 30.16 million
Masdar Clean Tech Fund, LP $ 30 million
US Venture Partners $ 27 million
Redpoint Ventures II, LP $ 20.16 million
RockPort Capital Partners III, LP $ 18.56 million
CMEA Ventures VI, LP $ 17.66 million
CMEA Ventures VII, LP $ 10 million
RockPort Capital Partners II, LP $ 5.97 million
Affiliates of Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (Fixed Income) LLC $ 2.07 million
Dr. James F. Gibbons $ 400,000
Raymond J. Sims $ 100,000
Total amount invested $ 598.864 million
6 The international political economy of polysilicon pricing is
not treated here, as this topic could not be adequately covered
within the limited space afforded here (but see Lo 2014).
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competitiveness of Solyndra’s products affected the
firm’s ability to attract private investment.
By the end of 2010, barely a year after its LGP loan
was authorized, it was clear that Solyndra faced
increasingly adverse market conditions, and that
polysilicon prices were but one of the firm’s problems.
Another difficulty was Solyndra’s cost base: the solar
arrays it manufactured cost around US$ 4 for every
watt of power output, but the firm could only sell them
for US$ 3.24 per watt. This was in stark comparison to
US competitor First Solar, which produced cadmium
telluride-based thin film panels at around a quarter of
Solyndra’s cost (Chernova 2011). Similarly low-
priced offerings were also available from polysili-
con-based Chinese manufacturers (DOE 2012g).
These difficulties led the firm to cancel an Initial
Public Offering (IPO) in June 2010. By November
2010, it started laying off employees. Its auditors had
already noted the corporation’s ‘recurring losses’ and
‘negative cash flows’. Recounting this, in a hearing of
the House of Representatives’ Committee on Energy
and Commerce before the Subcommittee on Oversight
and Investigations on 24 June 2011, Tennessee
Representative Marsha Blackburn stated that:
‘I thought it was interesting 6 months after the
loan guarantee was approved, Solyndra’s audi-
tor, PricewaterhouseCoopers, stated that the
company had suffered recurring losses from
operations, negative cash flow since inception,
and has a net stockholder’s deficit that, among
other concerns, raised substantial doubt about its
ability to continue as a going concern’ (Black-
burn 2011: 18).
It was later found, as reported by the DOE in 2015
following an investigation into the loan awaerd, that
Solyndra officials had potentially misled the DOE as
to the strength of orders and the market outlook for its
panels, before the loan award (DOE 2015). Issuance of
the LGP loan undoubtedly provided oxygen for the
continued survival of the firm, predicated in part on
increased production: Solyndra produced nearly 17
times more modules in 2009 than it did in 2008. Its
revenues rose from US$ 6.01 million in 2008–2009 to
a peak of US$ 140 million in 2010–2011. These
revenues, however, were lower than the firm’s
liabilities.
In addition to the drop in polysilicon prices, the
global 2008 financial crisis was deleterious for the
solar manufacturer. In a post-bankruptcy report by the
Chief Restructuring Officer in the Solyndra case, the
effects of the crisis were judged to have been
‘overwhelmingly negative for Solyndra’ (Neilson
2012: 43). This is because, firstly, the crisis stifled
attempts by the firm to raise capital through IPO or by
attracting additional infusions of private capital.
Secondly, Solyndra’s own customers faced difficulties
obtaining funding for their solar installation projects
due to the broader crisis in liquidity and the accom-
panying credit freeze. Thirdly, government assistance
for the solar industry was drastically reduced in
countries such as Spain and Italy, some of Solyndra’s
main target markets (DOE 2012g). These countries
were increasingly facing large budget deficits.
Government programs such as Feed-in Tariffs (FiTs)
to support renewables were crucial to Solyndra’s
business plan, as it is estimated that over 75 % of all
PV installations are a direct result of policies such as
FiTs (Couture et al. 2010). Thus, polysilicon price
fluctuations and the wider, global financial crisis
created a transnational economic context which
Solyndra found it hard to survive in, even with the
help of more than half a billion dollars in LGP
financing. The green niche around Solyndra was,
clearly, not effectively shielded against short-term
market fluctuations.
Within the context of rapid economic and political
deterioration, Solyndra’s bankruptcy took less than a
year to develop. While the firm sought alternative
private financing opportunities in early 2011, its
management reported in May 2011 that increased
financing was needed in order for operations to
continue for more than a month. Although the DOE
Fig. 1 Polysilicon prices and the rise and fall of Solyndra
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and some of Solyndra’s main private investors
provided US$ 29.2 million in last-minute funding,
this was insufficient, and the firm commenced selling
off inventory to lenders to provide liquidity. By the
end of August 2011, failure to structure a bridging
finance arrangement left Solyndra with no option other
than to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. On 31 August,
Solyndra ceased operations and most of its workforce
was laid off (Neilson 2012). Solyndra owned US$ 854
million in assets, but owed US $ 863 million (US
Bankruptcy Court 2012). This meant that several of
Solyndra’s financial backers became unsecured cred-
itors (US Bankruptcy Court 2011). The firm was not
the only LGP-funded enterprise to fail.7 However, the
bankruptcy quickly became a discursive and symbolic
rallying point for narratives aimed at constructing
green energy initiatives in specific, mainly negative
ways. This was augmented by the fact that in addition
to bankruptcy proceedings, Solyndra became the
centrepiece of an investigation into the events around
its collapse, involving the FBI as well as the DOE’s
Inspector General’s Office (Leone 2011).
Solyndra’s spectacular fall was accompanied by
discursive strategies that leveraged the firm’s collapse
to question the viability of government support for
green energy firms. At the same time, other discursive
strands focused on attempting to salvage the image
and identity of Solyndra and the solar niche. However,
the firm was, before its collapse, the centrepiece of
markedly different discursive strategies which posited
Solyndra as an example of the productive and positive
union of government and the private sector in gener-
ating cleaner, greener futures while solving the
problems caused by economic crisis. The following
section critically investigates these different but
coexisting narratives.
Discussion
Solyndra’s bankruptcy served as a temporal separator
between two main discursive trends. The first trend,
referred to below as promotion discourses, situated the
rise of Solyndra within a wider context in which green
energy was constructed as the repository of solutions
to economic crisis, job creation, and climate change.
In so doing, a positive vision of the green niche around
solar manufacturing was constructed. These dis-
courses were challenged, in turn, by discursive
strategies arising around the time of Solyndra’s
collapse, herein referred to as discourses of resistance.
While both discursive strategies coexisted to some
extent throughout Solyndra’s lifetime, the first set was
most prominent before the bankruptcy, and were then
superseded by discourses of resistance.
Promotion discourses
In the period to 2011, discursive strategies supporting
Solyndra focused on promoting the firm by construct-
ing it as: (a) an example of the financing of a market-
based ‘solution’ to climate crisis; (b) a catalyst for the
creation of ‘green collar jobs’ light of the financial
crisis; (c) a model of state-led green energy investment
which could successfully grow a key domestic corpo-
rate player in light of an increasing amount of
international competition in renewable energy
manufacturing.
Firstly, Solyndra was constructed as an innovative
response to concerns about climate change, and one
that could also provide positive returns on investment.
These twin, ecologically modernising strategies can be
seen in statements made by Solyndra’s CEO, Chris
Gronet, following the LGP loan:
‘The leadership and actions of President Barack
Obama, Energy Secretary Steven Chu and the
U.S. Congress were instrumental in concluding
this offer for a loan guarantee […] The DOE
Loan Guarantee Program funding will enable
Solyndra to achieve the economies of scale
needed to deliver solar electricity at prices that
are competitive with utility rates. This expansion
is really about creating new jobs while mean-
ingfully impacting global warming’ (Solyndra,
2009, emphasis added).
LGP financing was further presented as enabling
the corporation to both avoid CO2 emissions, and
promote economic growth through innovation and job
creation:
‘Over the life of the project, Solyndra estimates
that Fab 2 will produce solar panels sufficient
to… avoid 300 million metric tons of carbon
7 In October 2011, Beacon Power, which had received a US $
43 million loan under the LGP, declared bankruptcy (DOT
2012: 4).
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dioxide emissions. Further, Solyndra estimates
that the construction of this complex will employ
approximately 3000 people, the operation of the
facility will create over 1000 jobs, and hundreds
of additional jobs will be created for the
installation of Solyndra PV systems, in the
U.S.’ (Solyndra 2009).
Secondly, the justification of green energy financing
projects was also carried out through the discursive
strategy of depicting green energy technology manu-
facturing as a solution to economic crisis through
provision of ‘green’ job opportunities. Narratives
linking solar power’s low-carbon and job-creation
potential were deployed by Solyndra executives in
email communications with high-ranking DOE staff, in
order to push for rapid approval of LGP financing. In an
email from Chris Gronet to Steve Isakowitz, DOE Chief
Financial Officer, this discursive strategy is clear:
‘Jobs are at stake this time. […] My understand-
ing is that our objective in this program is to
create Green jobs and promote carbon reducing
technology like Solyndra’s. I hope and trust that
the result is not just the opposite because of our
lack of ability to execute according to commit-
ments’ (Gronet to Isakowitz, 12 January 2009).
The focus on linking Solyndra and job creation can
also be seen in a speech made by president Obama
during a visit (on 26 May 2010) to Solyndra’s Fremont
facility. Obama’s comments were made in the context
of the creation of ‘green collar jobs’ through funding
key innovators such as Solyndra:
‘[No]t only would this spur hiring by businesses,
it would create jobs in sectors with incredible
potential to propel our economy for years, for
decades to come. There is no better example than
energy’ (Obama 2010b).
During the same speech, he also stressed that:
‘[Th]ose guys in the back…have been building
this facility so that we can put more people back
to work and build more solar panels to send all
across the country’ (Obama 2010b).
These discursive strategies were part of a highly
successful attempt to attract attention and investment
capital. With a total of over US$ 1.2 billion in private
capital invested in the firm in 2005–2011, the solar
manufacturer attracted over four times the average
amount of private equity (US$ 300 million) invested in
other US solar firms (Neilson 2012).8 These invest-
ments were a response to the potential of Solyndra’s
technology, and helped to construct solar power as a
marketable and economically successful source of
energy (Lorenz et al. 2008). In identifying solar energy
as part of a wider, clean energy-fuelled recovery from
economic crisis, Obama stated, in the same speech
cited above, that:
‘So we recognized that we’ve got to go back to
basics. We’ve got to go back to making things.
We’ve got to go back to exports. We’ve got to go
back to innovation. And we recognized that there
was only so much government could do. The true
engine of economic growth will always be
companies like Solyndra, will always be Amer-
ica’s businesses. But that doesn’t mean the
government can just sit on the sidelines. […] So
that’s why, even as we’ve cut taxes and provided
emergency relief over the past year, we also
invested in […] clean energy’ (Obama 2010b).
Thirdly, the Solyndra loan was discursively per-
formed as an example of the successful promotion, by
the state, of firms in key strategic industries. In part,
this meant that Solyndra was described as a response
to transnational threats to US industry. During his visit
to the Solyndra site, Obama identified one of these
threats as non-US competitor corporations and foreign
subsidy and incentive regimes:
‘Around the world, from China to Germany, our
competitors are waging a historic effort to lead in
developing new energy technologies. There are
factories like this being built in China, factories
like this being built in Germany. Nobody is
playing for second place. These countries rec-
ognize that the nation that leads the clean energy
economy is likely to lead the global economy.
And if we fail to recognize that same imperative,
we risk falling behind’ (Obama 2010b).
This was also the case with other governmental
actors involved in the Solyndra loan. In a response to
the bankruptcy, for example, the DOE published a
8 Furthermore, Solyndra was not the largest attractor of private
equity in the solar energy field, but the fourth largest (Neilson
2012).
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page on its website reiterating the need to back solar
energy firms as a response to threats from international
competition:
‘When it comes to clean energy, we have a
choice to make. We can compete in the global
marketplace – creating American jobs and
selling American products – or we can buy the
technologies of tomorrow from abroad […]. Our
loan programs are today supporting a diverse
portfolio of more than 40 projects that plan to
employ 60,000 Americans and give us a chance
to compete and succeed in the global clean
energy race’ (DOE 2012a).
Solyndra was therefore discursively constructed and
performed as a sign and symbol of the narratives of
support outlined above. Specifically, constructions of
Solyndra justified the need for a state-supported niche
around solar manufacturing. It is clear from the dis-
courses above, however, that the resulting green niche
was conceptualised as not only responding to market
concerns, but existing within domestic and international
market parameters. As Newfield and Boudreaux (2014)
have shown, after LGP financing, Solyndra’s niche was
left to float or sink on the open market, and the discursive
narratives explored in the remainder of this section
highlight the co-constitution of narrative strategies and
the niche pathways that led to bankruptcy.
Discourses of resistance
The events surrounding Solyndra’s collapse heralded
the emergence of an oppositional set of discursive
strategies. These signified the rise to prominence of a
different but still heterogeneous network of actors
interested in discursively constructing the bankruptcy
in specific ways. Both discursive strategies of promo-
tion and resistance were political strategies, predicated
on different visions of energy futures, economic crisis,
climate change, the role of the US in the international
technology arena, and the level of state involvement
with the private sector in supporting socio-technical
niches. While the paper does not argue that discourses
of resistance existed exclusively in 2011 (indeed,
narratives of promotion and resistance can be seen as
constituting a discursive whole), the temporal bracket
surrounding the bankruptcy meant that the promi-
nence of one set of discursive strategies over another
significantly changed after 2011. While both sets of
discursive strategies were co-constituted, the bank-
ruptcy heralded a change in their geometry. The
discursive strategies of resistance examined here
constructed and performed Solyndra’s bankruptcy
as: (a) evidence that state financing of green niches
was inherently flawed; (b) proof that ‘green’ firms
cannot compete on the open market; (c) indication of
the continued desirability of fossil-fuel based ‘solu-
tions’ to energy security concerns.
Firstly, Solyndra’s failure was constructed as
confirmation of the logic that using government
subsidies to promote green niches was not a viable
strategy. For example, in a hearing of the congres-
sional Committee of Energy and Natural Resources in
June 2011, Lisa Murkowski, Republican Senator from
Alaska, reiterated that:
‘I think the Solyndra case demonstrates that our
problems can’t be solved by just pouring money
on the problems. All of the Loan Guarantees and
subsidies in the world will eventually be for
naught if the technology can’t stand on its own 2
feet in the marketplace. That means competing
on cost which requires lower energy costs. Our
economy needs abundant, inexpensive energy to
thrive. So when we’re talking about green
energy and creating green jobs, it’s important
to note that those jobs could be counterproduc-
tive for the overall economy if it results in
increased energy costs’ (Murkowski 2011: 2).
Although Murkowski’s statements need to be
contextualised within her broader support for expand-
ing oil and gas production (including onshore drilling
in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and in Arctic
waters) (Rampton and Rascoe 2012), and her cautious
support for the LGP after the Solyndra bankruptcy,
they paint a negative picture of government support
for green energy firms. Her statement also expresses
an assumption that niches, and the innovations they
are meant to foster, should not be shielded from ‘the
marketplace’. Another example of oppositional nar-
ratives that depict the green niche around Solyndra as
economically unsustainable is the Wikipedia page
titled The Solyndra Loan Controversy. The page
became a discursive battleground in the aftermath of
the bankruptcy (Wikipedia 2012).9 Created shortly
9 At the time of writing, the page redirected to the Wikipedia
entry on Solyndra: see Wikipedia (2012).
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after the bankruptcy, the webpage was subject to over
250 revisions by different users in the year to January
2012. Some of these edits negatively highlighted the
links between the Obama administration and Solyn-
dra, and bemoaned the administration’s support for the
firm. This highlights the bankruptcy’s role as a catalyst
which enabled the emergence of discursive strategies
of opposition. One of the most prominent actors in
constructing Solyndra as an example of the failure of
state support for a green niche was presidential
candidate Mitt Romney. Romney made a surprise
visit to Solyndra’s shuttered Fab. 2 manufacturing
facility in Fremont, California, on 31 May 2012,
echoing Obama’s visit to the same facility 2 years
earlier. However, Romney mobilised the bankruptcy
event to depict state investments in green energy as
unfeasible and wasteful:
‘You look at this building behind us; this is not
the kind of building that is built by private
enterprise… This is the kind of enterprise – the
kind of building – that’s built with half a billion
dollars of taxpayers’ money. It’s not just the Taj
Mahal of corporate headquarters. You probably
also heard that inside there are showers that have
LCD displays that tell what the temperatures are
of the shower water. And the robots inside
actually provide Disney music tunes’ (Romney,
in Friedman 2012).
The second discursive strand examined here
depicted Solyndra’s collapse as evidence that green
energy niches cannot survive on the open market
without government support. Again, this strategy was
promoted most strongly by political actors in opposi-
tion. Following the bankruptcy, the Republican
National Committee (RNC) produced a report linking
the DOE loan with the Obama administration (RNC
2012). This was part of a discursive strategy of
resistance because it highlighted the main discursive
justifications and constructions (outlined above) for
government support for Solyndra, and then presented
15 pages of quotes from a range of actors (news media,
politicians, investors), most of whom argued against
state support. One of the key ways in which Solyndra
(and by association, green technology firms) was
depicted by the RNC was as a corporation unable to
compete under ‘normal’ market conditions. For
example, the report cited a solar analyst stating that
‘to think they could compete on any basis, that took a
very big leap of faith’ (Misra, in RNC 2012: 5). In the
report, the funding of similar corporations was
described as being the Obama administration’s
attempt to engineer a ‘Sputnik moment’: a landmark
achievement defined by deep-pocketed state support.
The use of the term ‘Sputnik’ (as opposed to a perhaps
more appropriate use of ‘Apollo’ in relation to the US’
own costly space program) refers to Soviet funding of
a space programme which had overarching political-
ideological aims but which was wholly based on
arbitrary and non-transparent state funding. It also
highlights a deeper assumption: that socio-technical
innovations need to be exposed to the bracing winds of
free market competition from the outset, notwith-
standing the fact that several of the most well-known
and most innovative US technology firms (from Tesla
to Google) actively provide internal, protected
‘niches’ in which innovations can develop, succeed
or fail, or gain further traction before being introduced
to the market.
The oppositional strategy detailed above elicited
significant discursive resistance from actors involved
with Solyndra. Notably, the negative portrayal of
government support for green energy firms was coun-
tered by a June 2012 DOE report that aimed to defend
the LGP: two out of 14 pages focused on ‘recognition
and validation from the private sector’ (DOE 2012i). In
so doing, the DOE cited private sector sources such as
Project Finance Magazine, Renewable Energy World,
and Bloomberg Businessweek: the latter was promi-
nently cited as writing that ‘Solar is now bank-
able…[it’s] becoming part of a much broader capital
market’ (in DOE 2012i: 14). The emphasis was clearly
on showcasing the solar market, and associated
government support for green technologies, as exam-
ples of the proven innovative solutions that could
generate profits on the domestic and international
market. It is clear that DOE felt a need to justify its
support of Solyndra through recourse to the narratives
of support employed by other actors.
The third oppositional discursive strategy con-
structed the green niche around renewable energy
technologies as not containing solutions to issues of
energy security. Rather, the niche was depicted as
deflecting political attention and capital flows from
fossil fuel-based technologies, described as the real
providers of energy security, jobs, and potential for
sustainable operation and vigorous competition on the
‘open market’. An example of this is an article
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published by the Washington, DC-based Institute for
Energy Research (IER), a non-profit organization
broadly supportive of ‘free energy markets’ and
largely critical of green energy initiatives. The article
was authored by Mark Morabito (Chief Executive
Officer of Canadian firm The Exploration Group,
which specialises in developing resource opportuni-
ties, especially mining).10 It is an example of the
attempt to discursively define green energy niches,
such as the one around Solyndra, as dead-end
investments:
‘We all fell in love with the dangling carrot of a
clean energy future where our electricity would
come from nature herself […]. The idea
that…renewable technologies are here to free
us from pumping carbon dioxide into the atmo-
sphere while they generate the electricity
required to keep our advanced societies func-
tioning is patently false. But it’s a seductive
vision that environmentalists, governments,
politicians, entrepreneurs, media, and the public
bought into. Fast forward to Solyndra’s ‘cool
solar technology/no sustainable market for it’
failure. What we must start to realize is that no
matter how sleek, shiny, sexy and loved the solar
and wind energy technologies are, they are
doomed to fail’ (Morabito 2011: 1).
This discursive strategy was echoed and augmented
by political actors: Katie Brown, writing for the US
Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works,
decried the ‘Solyndra fantasy’ as an example of the
failure of heavily subsidised green energy firms to
move towards guaranteeing energy security:
‘Of course, oil and gas companies don’t receive
checks, grants, or direct payments from the
federal Treasury, as companies like Solyndra
did. This is simply an effort to make the
development of oil and gas more expensive…
It will also result in less domestic oil production,
putting our energy security even more at risk’
(Brown 2012: 1).
The discursive construction above failed to mention
the historical and contemporary state subsidies and
incentives that the oil, gas, coal and nuclear industries
have enjoyed over the past 200 years (Pfund and
Healey 2011). Nonetheless, what is evident is that
discursive strategies of resistance focused on the
bankruptcy as a way of challenging and undermining
the use of green niches. Although these constructions
were national in character and rooted in US domestic
politics (for example, discourses of resistance did not
consider the transnational effects of protected niches
in countries such as China on the development of
innovation in the US) they nonetheless expose the
political and contested nature of niche development
(Spa¨th and Rohracher 2010, 2012) which is integral to
national transition strategies and policies.
Discussion and conclusion
Daniel Poneman, US Deputy Secretary of Energy,
called the multiple factors that contributed to the
bankruptcy of Solyndra the ‘perfect storm’ which sank
the firm (DOE 2011b). The rise and fall of Solyndra
was a collection of events which, over the course of
half a decade, involved a range of actors, both human
and non-human. These included fluctuations in
polysilicon prices; the politics of the 2012 US
presidential election; tensions between Democrat
and Republican approaches to issues of energy
security, state involvement in the renewables sector,
and job creation; the entry of Chinese firms in the
global and US solar manufacturing market; the
positioning of solar power as central to concerns over
climate crisis by industry bodies, NGOs and other
actors; and changes in subsidy and incentive regimes
in China, Spain, Italy and other countries where solar
power was in demand in 2006–2011. However, it can
also be said that no individual event among these was
the single central phenomenon that led to the rise and/
or fall of Solyndra. In this conclusion, the argument is
that a.) the root cause for the failure of Solyndra was
the way(s) in which the green strategic niche around
solar manufacturing was conceived and deployed, and
that b.) this holds important lessons for the promotion
of transitional niches in the future. Although this paper
focused on Solyndra as the main case through which to
investigare these issues, it is worthy of note that of the
four solar manufacturing firms funded under the LGP,
two (Solyndra, Abound Solar) went bankrupt (see
Table 1). A third, SoloPower, suspended operations in
2013, announced plans to lay off its workforce, and10 Known as Forbes West since February 2012.
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eventually transferred its technology to a new corpo-
rate entity, Solopower Systems, Inc. This is indicative
of the fact that Solyndra was not a failure case in and of
itself, but an exemplar of niche failure.
This article focused on the Solyndra bankruptcy as
a way of exploring the institution of a protected niche
around a particular part of the green economy: solar
manufacturing. Several lessons can be drawn from the
Solyndra case, in terms of learning from niche failure.
Firstly, the Solyndra collapse is important because it
highlights a need for innovative niches to be appro-
priately shielded. This is especially so in situations
where transnational and political processes of pricing
may hinder or destroy innovative technologies that
may have long-range transitional benefits. In this
sense, it could be expected that other firms and
technologies experiencing the same market and polit-
ical conditions as Solyndra would likely fail: as seen
above, two of the four solar manufacturers awarded an
LGP loan went bankrupt, and a third was radically
restructured to prevent the same outcome. Further-
more, the Solyndra failure occurred within a wider
landscape of failure in solar manufacturing during a
phase of market consolidation in the early to mid-
2000s. As well as Solyndra, large solar manufacturers
(including China’s Suntech and LDK Solar) were
among the hundreds of solar firms that declared
bankruptcy in 2010–2015.11 The need for shielding is
based on the recognition that the market does not
necessarily know best, as eloquently shown in the case
of the 2008 financial crisis. It is also based on the
recognition that the Solyndra case was not isolated or
exceptional: although the firm was found to have
potentially misled DOE officials in the loan award
process, the same cannot be said of the other two solar
manufacturing corporations supported with an LGP
loan and which also ran into problems. Nonetheless, it
is also true that Solyndra’s tubular technology was
seen as innovative and potentially disruptive by a wide
range of actors, as shown above. The lack of longi-
tudinal shielding can be seen as part and parcel of a
process which, while it did not result in the failure of
the solar industry more generally, did have the
consequence of ‘shutting out’ (at least temporarily) a
potentially breakthrough technology. As the history of
technological innovations has shown, for example in
the movement from state-led to industrial space flights
and ‘space tourism’, a period of secured and shielded
innovative development, including the acceptance of
failure, is often necessary in forging societal pathways
to new socio-technical futures.
The argument for the necessity of appropriate niche
shielding is therefore, also based on recognition of the
need for shielding of socio-technical niches to be more
consistent than the scant protection offered to Solyn-
dra after the LGP loan award. Had Solyndra been more
carefully protected, with a decadal as opposed to the
quarter-on-quarter performance emphasis within
which its management, investors, and the LGP oper-
ated, then the sort of thin-film tubular technology with
which the firm aimed to use to turn commercial
rooftops into energy-generating spaces could have
been a more likely target of wider adoption. In the
context of current US neoliberal economic-environ-
mental policy, this may be a lesson that is only learnt
as a result of what can be predicted to be continuous
and consistent setbacks due to the long-term approach
taken by countries such as China in terms of strategic,
transition-focused industrial–environmental invest-
ments (Yi and Liu 2015). What is clear is the need
for longitudinal support of green niches, designed with
sensitivity to the transnational dimensions of existing
regimes. The paper has shown that in the Solyndra
case, the regime had clearly important spatial charac-
teristics found in the Chinese and US energy contexts,
but that the regime cannot be considered as fully
bounded by national borders and geopolitical
territorialisation.
Secondly, the bankruptcy highlights the requisite
for niche protection strategies to focus less on market
forces and more on ‘visionary industrial policy’
(Newfield and Boudreaux 2014, 69). A corollary of
this is that less emphasis should be placed on VC
investment as the financial lifeblood of protected
niches. Rather, a focus on strategic, mostly public
investment, needs to replace the current assumption
that private financing is the main mechanism with
which innovations should be supported. This means
recognising the need for niche-focused policies char-
acterised by longevity, high tolerance of failure cases,
and rapid adoption of exogenous, innovative ideas and
approaches. In the Solyndra case, the fact that the US
government itself became an investor and creditor of
Solyndra rather than its strategic partner heightened
the pressure felt by the corporation, and increased the
11 From 2009 to 2014, 112 solar energy corporations in the USA
and EU declared bankruptcy (Bastasch 2014).
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failure risk as soon as loan repayment started to look
unlikely in the short term. This can be seen through the
discursive analysis outlined above: while the LGP
loan was promoted as an example of the need for state
support of green energy corporations, what the
promotional discourses hid from view was the fact
that the construction of Fab. 2 was a significant factor
in Solyndra’s subsequent failure to attract sufficient
private investment, despite the fact that company
executives working in the CIGS market point to a lack
of new production facilities, not CIGS technologies in
themselves, as a key determinant of the failure of
many CIGS-based solar manufacturers since 2010,
including Solyndra (Wesoff 2015). Furthermore, and
at least until January 2011, private investment was
inhibited by the US government’s demand for creditor
priority in the event of company failure. This deterred
private investors from taking stakes in Solyndra, as it
would have resulted in their taking on default risk
(Chernova 2011). Thus, the way in which the loan was
structured contributed to the generation of a higher
risk profile for would-be investors, who became
unwilling to commit capital to a corporation that
may not have been able to return it in the event of
failure, because the first recipient of funds was to be
the state. In this light, the loan was both a necessity
(for the upgrading of manufacturing facilities) and a
significant hindrance (through a raising of Solyndra’s
risk profile) to Solyndra’s economic viability. What is
clear is the desirability of agencies of the state (such as
the DOE) becoming strategic investors rather than
creditors.
Lastly, the article’s focus on the discursive
construction of the Solyndra case underlines the
importance of considering niches, and their devel-
opment pathways (including eventual failure), as
results of a complex process which is discursive,
and therefore politically, culturally and socially
performed and produced (Caprotti 2012; Levin
2008; Pryke and du Gay 2007). Polysilicon prices
were clearly directly related to the political, transi-
tional strategy enacted by the Chinese government
in terms of its solar manufacturing subsidies. The
reduction in support for solar installations by
European governments (key customers in Solyndra’s
operational planning) was the result of national
austerity policies enacted as a result of the 2008
financial crisis. Specific actors’ discursive perfor-
mance and framing of Solyndra as a ‘failure’ and an
example of the need for entrepreneurial corporations
to be left to sink or swim in the ‘free market’ also
exposes the important role of discourse in construct-
ing green niches and, more importantly, the role of
the state vis-a`-vis these niches. In the context of this
paper, it can be argued that it was in fact the state
(and specifically the DOE) that can be considered,
in part at least, as an entrepreneurial, activist actor,
investing in a corporation with a high risk-return
profile. What was lacking was long-range niche
support and protection as a requirement for success.
What is at stake is, at heart, the balance between the
socialisation of risk and the privatisation of reward.
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